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INTRODUCTION 
“Voters may wonder why campaigns use negative ‘attack’ advertising. 
The answer is, because it works.”1 
Admit it. You have told many people how much you hate negative cam-
paign ads, right? And, you have agreed with many other people who have said 
the same thing. I know I have made this claim many times, and in my heart I 
believe it; I really do hate all the mudslinging and attacking. But, as often as all 
of us say this, the barrage of negative campaigning never seems to end. Instead, 
it now reaches beyond the realm of high-stakes national politics and is becom-
ing commonplace, even in local elections.2 
The reason that this tactic is growing is obvious: it works. Cognitive psy-
chologists attribute this to a phenomenon they call the brain’s “negativity bi-
as.”3 That is, our brains are more apt to process, and retain, negative infor-
mation as opposed to positive information. As one neuropsychologist has put it, 
“[y]our brain is like Velcro for negative experiences and Teflon for positive 
ones.”4 
Several years ago, a group of researchers at Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity analyzed all of the then-current studies that compared the relative strengths 
of good and bad stimuli.5 They hoped to identify different phenomena where 
bad or negative stimuli had more power effects on people, and a different group 
of phenomena where good or positive stimuli had more power. After identify-
ing these phenomena, they hoped to study them to determine how and why 
                                                        
1  Al Tompkins-Poynter, The Power of Negative Political Ads, HELP FOR JOURNALISTS, 
http://helpforjournalists.com/political-advertising/the-power-of-negative-political-ads/ (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2015). 
2  Ruthann Lariscy, Why Negative Political Ads Work, CNN (Jan. 2, 2012, 11:57 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/02/opinion/lariscy-negative-ads/ (“While at one time attacks 
were reserved largely for campaigns for national office, today they are evident in local and 
statewide campaigns as well.”). 
3  Scholars have used various terms to refer to this phenomenon, but the term “negativity bi-
as” has emerged as the most common term. See, e.g., Stacey Wood & Michael A. Kisley, 
The Negativity Bias Is Eliminated in Older Adults: Age-Related Reduction in Event-Related 
Brain Potentials Associated with Evaluative Categorization, 21 PSYCHOL. & AGING 815 
(2006). 
4  RICK HANSON WITH RICHARD MENDIUS, BUDDHA’S BRAIN: THE PRACTICAL NEUROSCIENCE 
OF HAPPINESS, LOVE & WISDOM 41 (2009). Think about what this means for the law profes-
sor: which student evaluations do you remember the longest, or think about the most? That 
one negative evaluation, maybe merely from a student who was having a bad day at the time, 
is likely to be the one that affects you the most. 
5  See generally Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad Is Stronger Than Good, 5 REV. GEN. 
PSYCHOL. 323 (2001). It is, of course, difficult to put a definitive meaning on the terms “bad” 
and “good.” Baumeister and his team of researchers did not even try to define the terms 
closely, describing “bad” only as “temptation and destructive instincts” and “good” as “striv-
ings for virtue, altruism, and fulfillment.” Id. at 323 They conclude by observing that 
“ ‘[g]ood’ and ‘bad’ are among the first words and concepts learned by children (and even by 
house pets), and most people can readily characterize almost any experience, emotion, or 
outcome as good or bad.” Id. 
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good and bad stimuli work on our brains. What the researchers found surprised 
them: bad stimuli had significantly more power “across a broad range of psy-
chological phenomena.”6 They found no area where good stimuli were more 
powerful than bad ones, although they did find a few areas in which other psy-
chological processes overrode the negative stimuli.7 
What are the implications of this finding for legal writing?8 For example, 
how do judges respond to negative themes in briefs? Should lawyers phrase 
their legal arguments in terms of avoiding bad outcomes instead of promoting 
good outcomes? Should rule statements in briefs highlight the possible negative 
consequences of a particular ruling as opposed to a positive outcome? Does this 
finding change the way lawyers should do, or at least think about, counteranal-
ysis? Does a judge’s negative opinion of an advocate have more power than a 
potential positive view of the client? 
Answering these questions in the affirmative might be controversial. Many 
judges (as well as many legal writing professors) counsel lawyers and law stu-
dents to avoid the negative, and emphasize the positive.9 Given the near ubiqui-
tousness of this advice, it seems that the cognitive psychology on negativity bi-
as is worth studying. Have we all been giving bad advice all this time? 
                                                        
6  Id. at 354. 
7  Id. at 354–55. 
8  This article specifically focuses on judges and written persuasion. The implications of this 
finding on influencing jurors are, of course, significant. See generally, e.g., DAVID BALL & 
DON KEENAN, REPTILE: THE 2009 MANUAL OF THE PLAINTIFF’S REVOLUTION (2009) (discuss-
ing ways in which plaintiff’s attorneys can appeal to juror’s embedded “reptile” in order to 
counteract negative information previously implanted in their brains by the tort reform 
movement). I have chosen to focus on the implications for written advocacy and the judicial 
audience here because I think that question is more interesting and complex. Does a judge’s 
special training and experience in the law provide the judge with more tools to resist, or at 
least process, negative information? 
9  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Friedman Lecture in Appellate Advocacy, 23 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 1, 6–7 (2013–14) (suggesting that advocates confront their opposing counsel’s counter-
arguments by dealing with them as part of your “positive theme” of the case); Gerald Lebo-
vits et al., Winning the Moot Court Oral Argument: A Guide for Intramural and Intermural 
Moot Court Competitors, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 887, 903 (2013) (advising moot court competi-
tors that “a winning theme addresses the positive policy implications of a ruling in the advo-
cate’s favor”); Laurie A. Lewis, Winning the Game of Appellate Musical Shoes: When the 
Appeals Band Plays, Jump from the Client’s to the Judge’s Shoes to Write the Statement of 
Facts Ballad, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 1017 (2011) (recommending that brief writers 
emphasize good facts and de-emphasize bad facts to cast the client in a positive light); Jane 
R. Roth & Mani S. Walia, Persuading Quickly: Tips for Writing an Effective Appellate Brief, 
11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 443, 445–46 (2010) (recommending that advocates present both 
legally relevant facts and additional facts that add to the human interest in order to portray 
the client in a positive light); Gerald Lebovits, Free at Last from Obscurity: Clarity—Part 2, 
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., Jan. 2004, at 64, 64 (again advocating that lawyers “writ[e] in the posi-
tive”); Steven R. Merican, Thoughts from an Unconstrained Practitioner: Writing an Appel-
late Brief, or, How to Make Tax Law an Interesting Read, 19 DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N 
BRIEF, Mar. 2007, at 10, 11 (arguing that “[r]eadability and persuasiveness are improved by 
being assertive and positive”). The list could go on indefinitely. 
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Part I of this article will explore the cognitive psychology literature docu-
menting the extent of the brain’s negativity bias. Part II turns to an examination 
of the potential reasons why this might be true, starting with the theory first 
enunciated by Paul MacLean that all humans have a “triune brain” that includes 
a “reptilian” brain to control basic survival needs, a limbic system which con-
trols emotional responses, and a neocortex which controls rational thought. It 
examines these questions from both a social science perspective as well as a 
public policy and political perspective. Part III then explores what this might 
mean for the attorney seeking to persuade a judge through written advocacy. 
Finally, Part IV concludes with some thoughts on future research regarding 
how these concepts might affect judicial thinking. 
This article is an expanded version of a presentation I gave at the Confer-
ence on Psychology and Lawyering: Coalescing the Field, held in February 
2014 at the University of Nevada Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of 
Law.10 That conference was intended to begin conversations not only among 
the various disciplines in legal academia, but also between legal academia and 
other disciplines, such as cognitive psychology, about the areas where law and 
psychology intersect. This article does not propose definitive answers to the 
questions it raises, although it does propose some hypotheses based on cogni-
tive science. Rather, this article is intended to be a conversation starter. The 
implications of the negativity bias for written persuasion are large, as suggested 
above. Such questions can only be answered definitively through valid empiri-
cal testing.11 I hope to conduct some empirical research on these topics, and I 
hope this article will inspire others to conduct similar studies. 
I. BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 
Current thinking in cognitive psychology is that people (both adults and 
children) display what is called a “negativity bias.”12 One group of researchers 
concluded that “adults spend more time looking at negative than at positive 
stimuli, perceive negative stimuli to be more complex than positive ones, and 
                                                        
10  I also presented some of this material at the Fourth Applied Legal Storytelling Conference 
in London, England in July, 2013. 
11  Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit has written that “[l]ogic plays only a lim-
ited role in adjudication, especially at the appellate level . . . , relative to psychology—an 
understudied influence on judicial behavior.” RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 376–
77 (2008). Judge Posner has recently teamed up with two professors to conduct empirical 
studies of what we might learn about judicial behavior by examining their decisions. See 
generally LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL & 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (using a methodology that is unlike most so-
cial science research because the authors do not engage the test subjects (judges) directly. 
Instead, the authors look at actual judicial decisions and compare the outcomes to other ob-
servable characteristics of the individual judges to draw inferences about possible motivating 
factors). 
12  See, e.g., Wood & Kisley supra note 3. Others refer to this phenomenon as “negativity 
dominance.” DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 300–02 (2011). 
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form more complex cognitive representations of negative than of positive stim-
uli.”13 This section of the article first examines the evidence in social science 
literature about the nature and extent of the negativity bias, then looks at the 
issue through the lens of public policy and politics. 
A. Social Science Findings 
Negative experiences are more powerful than positive ones. This is true 
across a wide range of phenomena. In 2001, a group of cognitive psychologists 
at Case Western Reserve University analyzed all of the then-current studies that 
compared the relative strength of good and bad effects.14 For example, one 
study the authors analyzed found that in personal relationships, it takes at least 
five positive experiences to overcome the feelings generated by one negative 
one.15 They also observed that “[a]mong journalists and communication scien-
tists, it is considered common knowledge that bad events are more newsworthy 
and attract more reader attention” and that “bad news sells more papers.”16 
Recent scholarship in the Applied Legal Storytelling17 movement makes a 
similar point. I have pointed out elsewhere that “conflict is the fuel that drives 
the story.”18 L.A. Fiedler has likewise pointed out that “no one has ever been 
able to make a successful novel about a happy marriage.”19 Conflict is interest-
ing; it makes us pay attention. And, let’s face it, without conflict there would be 
no lawsuits. 
Many of the studies analyzed in the Case Western study suggest that nega-
tive information is retained longer and affects us more because the brain pro-
cesses negative stimuli more thoroughly, possibly because it is evolutionarily 
                                                        
13  Amrisha Vaish et al., Not All Emotions Are Created Equal: The Negativity Bias in Social-
Emotional Development, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 383, 383 (2008). 
14  See generally Baumeister et al., supra note 5. 
15  See JOHN GOTTMAN, WHY MARRIAGES SUCCEED OR FAIL AND HOW TO MAKE YOURS LAST 
29 (1994). 
16  Baumeister, supra note 5, at 343. 
17  The Applied Legal Storytelling movement (sometimes referred to as AppLS) is a body of 
scholarship that studies how storytelling affects the judicial process. Ruth Anne Robbins, An 
Introduction to Applied Storytelling and to This Symposium, 14 LEGAL WRITING 3, 3 (2008) 
(introducing a symposium issue of that journal which published a group of articles presented 
at the Once upon a Legal Time: Developing the Skills of Storytelling in Law conference held 
in London, England in 2007). The London conference has been followed by additional con-
ferences in Portland, Oregon in 2009, Denver, Colorado in 2011, and another conference in 
London in 2013. A fifth AppLS conference is scheduled for the summer of 2015 in Seattle, 
Washington. Many scholarly articles have been published out of these conferences. 
18  Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING 
127, 140 (2008); accord Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for 
Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 
RUTGERS L.J. 459, 466 (2001). 
19  Baumeister, supra note 5, at 343 (citing L.A. FIEDLER, LOVE AND DEATH IN THE 
AMERICAN NOVEL (1982)). 
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adaptive behavior.20 That is, bad things can kill us, while good things generally 
cannot. Organisms that are more attuned to detecting and reacting to bad things 
are therefore more likely to survive. 
Because we are prone to processing bad information more extensively, we 
are more likely to remember bad things. For example, in one study the investi-
gators simply asked people to recall a recent emotional event that had affected 
them, either positive or negative. The subjects reported negative events more 
often than positive ones, by about a four-to-one margin.21 Another study 
showed that test subjects remembered more negative words than positive ones, 
and that the negative words (stimuli) resulted in slower responses and more eye 
blinks, indicating greater conscious processing of the negative stimuli.22 
In another study, researchers interviewed three groups: people who had 
won a lottery about a year before the interview, people who had suffered paral-
ysis in an accident about a year before the interview, and a third group who had 
not experienced any kind of major life-changing event within the last year. Al-
though the group which had suffered paralysis reported significantly lower 
happiness one year after that event, the lottery winners did not report any sig-
nificantly higher level of happiness over the control group, suggesting once 
again that bad feelings and emotions are much longer-lasting than good ones.23 
Negative information is weighted more heavily than positive information 
in forming impressions of others. The Case Western researchers described 
nearly twenty studies that all confirmed that negative information about another 
person was retained longer and had a more profound impact on test subjects’ 
overall impressions of that other person.24 One of those studies also found that 
persons evaluating others were more confident about their bad impressions of 
the other than they were of their favorable impression of others with good 
traits.25 
But, several studies surveyed by the Case Western researchers revealed an 
important nuance: there seems to be a negativity bias when one evaluates an-
other’s moral behavior, but a positivity bias when evaluating the other’s com-
petence. That is, immoral or dishonest behavior was more important in judging 
                                                        
20  Baumeister, supra note 5, at 325. 
21  Catrin Finkenauer & Bernard Rimé, Socially Shared Emotional Experiences vs. Emotion-
al Experiences Kept Secret: Differential Characteristics and Consequences, 17 J. SOC. & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 295 (1998). 
22  Hideki Ohira et al., Effects of Stimulus Valence on Recognition Memory and Endogenous 
Eyeblinks: Further Evidence for Positive-Negative Asymmetry, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 986, 989–90 (1998). 
23  Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 918–19, 923–24 (1978). 
24  Baumeister, supra note 5, at 344–48; accord Guido Peeters & Janusz Czapinksi, Positive-
Negative Asymmetry in Evaluations: The Distinction Between Affective and Informational 
Negativity Effects, 1 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 33, 33–34 (1990). 
25  Baumeister, supra note 5, at 345 (discussing David L. Hamilton & Mark P. Zanna, Dif-
ferential Weighting of Favorable and Unfavorable Attributes in Impressions of Personality, 
6 J. EXPERIMENTAL RES. PERSONALITY 204 (1972)). 
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another person’s moral trait, but extremely intelligent acts were more important 
in judging another person’s competence.26 One of the studies surveyed states 
the following theory: 
[O]ne may be regarded as a liar despite telling the truth on many occasions, but 
one will not be regarded as an honest man if he tells many lies. The opposite 
may apply to intelligence, however, because a stupid person can never be bril-
liant, whereas a very intelligent person can occasionally do a stupid thing.27 
More recent research adds another nuance to the concept that bad is strong-
er than good: there may be age-related differences in the negativity bias. Per-
haps counterintuitively, some researchers have found that the negativity bias is 
less pronounced as people age. One group of researchers concluded that the 
frequency of experiencing negative emotions declines as people age, leveling 
off around age sixty.28 They conclude that although older people are just as 
likely as younger people to perceive threatening information, they are less like-
ly to dwell on it. Instead, older people tend to focus more on positive infor-
mation.29 
Two researchers at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs recorded 
electrophysiological signals to measure reactions when subjects were presented 
with a range of different images.30 The images were selected randomly to show 
positive, negative, and neutral emotional content. The subjects varied in age 
from nineteen to eighty-one years old. They found that the younger group re-
acted more strongly to emotionally valenced images (either positive or nega-
tive) than to neutral images, with negative images producing the largest reac-
tion. The older adults also responded more significantly to the valenced images 
as opposed to the neutral ones, but the degree of their reaction to positive and 
negative images was just about the same.31 This suggests that the negativity bi-
as may decline or disappear over time. 
In a follow-up study, these researchers were able to replicate the results on 
a slightly larger sample of adults between the ages of eighteen and eighty-
                                                        
26  Id. at 346–47. 
27  Id. at 346 (discussing John J. Skowronski & Donal E. Carlston, Caught in the Act: When 
Impressions Based on Highly Diagnostic Behaviours are Resistant to Contradiction, 22 EUR. 
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 435 (1992)). This distinction between moral and competence evaluations 
has significant implications for lawyer credibility, of course. Much has been written about 
how a lawyer’s ethos can impact how a case is decided. See, e.g., Michael Frost, Ethos, Pa-
thos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85, 85–86 (1994); Melissa H. Weresh, Morality, 
Trust, and Illusion: Ethos as Relationship, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 229, 231 
(2012). However, that subject is beyond the scope of this article. 
28  Mara Mather & Laura L. Carstensen, Aging and Motivated Cognition: The Positivity Ef-
fect in Attention and Memory, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 496, 496 (2005). 
29  Id. 
30  Wood & Kisley, supra note 3, at 817. 
31  Id. at 816–19. 
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one.32 They concluded that the reduced negativity bias resulted from older 
adults attending less to negative information as they age, whereas the older 
adults attended to positive image at about the same rate as younger adults. They 
presented their findings in three scatter plots, showing the responses of all sub-
jects to neutral, negative, and positive information. Consistent with their prior 
study, the “best fit” regression lines showed stronger reactions to both the posi-
tive and negative images than to the neutral images. However, the regression 
line for positive information was essentially flat: older subjects had the same 
level of reaction to positive information as did the younger subjects.33 
The regression line for the negative images showed a steady decline in the 
amplitude of subjects’ reactions over time. At age twenty, the reaction to nega-
tive images was nearly twice as strong as to the positive images. By age sixty, 
however, the reaction to negative information was only slightly stronger than to 
positive information. By age eighty, the reactions were approximately the 
same.34 The authors hypothesized that this effect might be the result of inten-
tional efforts by older adults to focus their attention more on positive infor-
mation, perhaps in an effort to “maximize emotional goals as one’s perceived 
remaining lifetime becomes shorter.”35 
This effect may also be a result of the greater life experience of older per-
sons, which provides them with more context in which to evaluate negative ex-
periences. Whatever the cause, however, the effect is the same: it may be pos-
sible to overcome the negativity bias through conscious effort.36 
B. Public Policy Example 
Fear is very effective in persuading people. We need only look to our re-
cent history of how a majority of American citizens were persuaded that invad-
ing Iraq was a good idea. 
Jonathan Marks, a professor of bioethics, humanities, and law at Penn State 
University, describes the type of “social cascades” that can lead people to false 
conclusions.37 He argues that the news media’s uncritical reporting of govern-
ment positions led people to believe three things that turned out to be untrue: 
“(i) that evidence of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda had been found; (ii) that 
weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq; and (iii) that world public 
                                                        
32  Michael A. Kisley et al., Looking at the Sunny Side of Life: Age-Related Change in an 
Event-Related Potential Measure of the Negativity Bias, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 838, 838–39 
(2007). 
33  Id. at 841. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. at 842. 
36  See id. Or, stated another way, the brain’s System 2 might be trained to overcome an in-
accurate or unproductive System 1 response. For a fuller discussion of this possibility, see 
infra Part III.A.1. 
37  Jonathan Marks, The Fourth Estate and the Case for War in Iraq: Apology or Apologia, 
in THE AGE OF APOLOGY: FACING UP TO THE PAST 298, 300 (Mark Gibney et al. eds., 2008). 
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opinion favored the U.S. going to war with Iraq.”38 He then documented sever-
al public opinion polls that demonstrated that a majority of Americans still held 
some or all of these beliefs even after numerous non-partisan investigations, 
including the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the 9/11 Commis-
sion, had proven that all three claims were false.39 
Professor Marks concludes that the media became complicit in playing up 
the government’s preferred narrative of imminent danger to American interests 
out of fear of being branded as “traitors” or (perhaps even worse?) “liberals” by 
other media outlets, which would result in a loss of viewers or readers.40 
I have a slightly different, but not inconsistent, theory: fear sells.41 Readers 
are attuned to negative information for the same reason that the negativity bias 
is evolutionarily adaptive: you need to know about the bad stuff that might 
cause you harm. We cannot escape the reptile buried deep within our psyches. 
II. WHY IS BAD STRONGER THAN GOOD? 
One might suppose that the negativity bias is something that a trained 
mind, like a lawyer or judge, may be able to overcome through higher cognitive 
functions, like logical reasoning.42 Cognitive science, however, suggests other-
wise. Because the negativity bias is thought to be an evolutionary adaptation, it 
                                                        
38  Id. at 302. 
39  Id. at 303. 
40  Id. at 307. If this is true, this could be yet another demonstration of the power of the nega-
tivity bias; fear of the loss of ratings trumped good journalistic ethics and practices. 
41  Id. at 303–04 (documenting the ways in which the negative claims put forth by the gov-
ernment were given front-page or “top of the news” play in numerous media outlets, while 
subsequent refutations of those claims were buried or even went unreported). Public opinion 
about the recent revelations about the National Security Agency’s program of collecting in-
formation about domestic e-mail and telephone traffic may provide another example of how 
fear influences opinions. A Pew Research Center study in July 2013 revealed that, while 56 
percent of those polled believed the federal courts had failed to provide “adequate limits”  
on what the NSA was collecting, 30 percent still approved of the program’s limits.  
Few See Adequate Limits on NSA Surveillance Program, PEW RESEARCH CENTER,  
(July 26, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/26/few-see-adequate-limits-on-nsa-sur 
veillance-program/. Ultimately, 50 percent of respondents approved of the program overall, 
while 44 percent disapproved (6 percent had no opinion). Id. Apparently, at least for some 
people the fear of terrorism still trumped civil liberties. In other words, bad was stronger 
than good in the Pew poll. 
42  It is not my intention in this article to get into the age-old battle between legal realism and 
legal positivism; I align myself strongly with the legal realists. But Profs. Lee Epstein and 
William M. Landes and Judge Richard A. Posner have proposed a more nuanced theory of 
judicial behavior which they call the labor market theory of judicial behavior. EPSTEIN ET AL, 
supra note 11, at 5. This theory is essentially a variety of legal realism in which judges are 
seen as rational actors in a labor market consisting of all judges, and then studies their be-
havior in light of all of the things that affect workers in any labor market (e.g. pecuniary fac-
tors such as pay and benefits, and more importantly non-pecuniary factors such as job satis-
faction, esteem, reputation, leisure, opportunities for job advancement and promotion, pro-
professional and institutional norms, etc.). Id. 
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is very deeply seated in our psyches.43 It probably resides in the amygdala, the 
portion of the brain that is closely associated with emotional processing and 
fear responses.44 
Neuroscientist Paul MacLean first developed the theory that our brains 
evolved in three stages, which he called the “triune brain.”45 The first brain 
structure to evolve was what he termed the “protoreptilian formation,” or “R-
complex,” which many people now refer to as the “reptilian brain.”46 The rep-
tilian brain controls involuntary motor movements, instinctive behaviors, as 
well as the so-called “fight or flight” response; its primary function is self-
preservation of the organism.47 Second, the paleomammalian brain (also called 
                                                        
43  Daniel Kahneman, who describes two types of mental processes as “System 1” and “Sys-
tem 2” thinking, agrees that what he calls the “negativity dominance” phenomenon is a result 
of evolutionary adaptation. KAHNEMAN, supra note 12, at 300–01 (“The brains of humans 
and other animals contain a mechanism that is designed to give priority to bad news. By 
shaving a few hundredths of a second from the time needed to detect a predator, this circuit 
improves the animal’s odds of living long enough to reproduce. The automatic operations of 
System 1 reflect this evolutionary history.”); see discussion of System 1 and System 2 think-
ing infra Part III.A.1. 
44  See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 12, at 301; Alberto A. Rasia-Filho et al., Functional Ac-
tivities of the Amygdala: An Overview, 25 J. PSYCHIATRY & NEUROSCIENCE 14, 15–17 
(2000). A normal brain has two amygdalae, one in each hemisphere of the brain. JOSEPH 
LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 
157 (1996). 
45  See generally PAUL D. MACLEAN, THE TRIUNE BRAIN IN EVOLUTION: ROLE IN 
PALEOCEREBRAL FUNCTIONS (1990). 
It should be noted that some scholars have criticized the triune brain theory as an over-
simplification. See, e.g., ANN B. BUTLER & WILLIAM HODOS, COMPARATIVE VERTEBRATE 
NEUROANATOMY: EVOLUTION AND ADAPTATION 114 (2d ed. 2005) (“Although MacLean’s 
theory has had no significant impact on neurobiology, it has become popular in the lay press 
and among some psychological and educational therapists . . . . The extensive body of work 
in comparative neurobiology over the past three decades unequivocally contradicts this theo-
ry.”); C.U.M. (Chris) Smith, The Triune Brain in Antiquity: Plato, Aristotle, Erasistratus, 19 
J. HIST. NEUROSCIENCES 1, 13 (2010) (“It may be . . . that the Western mind has been condi-
tioned to accept tripartite schematics by its millennial experience of tripartite social stratifi-
cations. Perhaps it is now time to discard such age-old and nowadays unconvincing analo-
gies and acknowledge that the brain and the mind have a far more intricate dynamic.”). 
While these criticisms have merit for the experts who continue to advance knowledge in this 
field, for our more simple purposes in this article, the concept of the reptilian brain provides 
a useful framework for thinking about how and why the negativity bias works. 
46  See MACLEAN, supra note 45, at 15. 
47  For a more colorful, albeit less scientific, explanation of the function of the reptilian 
brain, see BALL AND KEENAN, supra note 8, at 13. They base their conclusions on MacLean’s 
“triune brain” theory: 
The Reptilian brain houses basic life functions, such a breathing, balance, hunger, 
the sex drive, and the fundamental life force: survival. The Reptile does not tend to 
these functions solely to keep you alive. Her larger purpose is to keep your genes 
alive and spread as many of them as possible into future generations. This impulse 
drives all life. Even people who want no children cannot normally get rid of the Rep-
tilian imperative of personal survival. Nor can they get rid of the Reptilian drives that 
the Reptile has developed for the creation and nurturing of children (such as the sex 
drive). 
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the “limbic system”) evolved, primarily involved with controlling emotional 
responses.48 MacLean points out that the limbic system can serve as a sort of 
“amplifier” for guiding behavior required for “self-preservation and preserva-
tion of the species,” a function also found in the reptilian brain.49 Finally, the 
neomammalian brain (also called the “neocortex”) evolved, responsible for ra-
tional thought.50 Unlike the reptilian brain and limbic system, the neocortex is 
primarily oriented toward the external world.51 
MacLean acknowledges that all three systems are interrelated and to some 
degree interdependent;52 more recent studies confirm that the three systems 
must work together.53 However, the basic concept of the triune brain is still 
useful in thinking about the influence of both the reptilian brain and the emo-
tional brain (limbic system) on the logical brain (the neocortex). For example, 
one explanation of the emotional brain is that it evolved to make us feel fear or 
pleasure in order to do what the reptilian brain deems necessary for survival.54 
And, as neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and others have demonstrated, the log-
ical brain literally cannot function without input from the emotional brain.55 We 
cannot escape our instincts.56 
                                                                                                                                
We like to believe we are run by logic and emotion. Sometimes we are. But when 
something we do or don’t do can affect—even a little—our safety or the propagation 
and safety of our genes, the Reptile takes over. If your cognitive or emotional brain 
resists, the Reptile turns it to her will. The greater the perceived danger to you or your 
offspring, the more firmly the Reptile controls you. 
In other words, the Reptile invented and built the rest of the brain, and now she 
runs it. 
Id. at 17. This may explain in part why negative campaign ads are so effective. If they 
demonstrate a threat to the viewer or the viewer’s offspring, the reptilian brain automatically 
kicks in and takes defensive measures (such as “Don’t ever vote for that other candidate who 
poses such a threat!”). 
48  MACLEAN, supra note 45, at 16–17. 
49  Id. at 17. 
50  Id. at 17–18. 
51  Id. at 17. It should be noted that other scholars dispute the location-specific nature of 
these brain functions. For example, Daniel Kahneman disclaims that his “System 1” and 
“System 2” processes reside in any specific part of the brain. KAHNEMAN, supra note 11, at 
29. 
52  MACLEAN, supra note 45, at 9. He also claims that these three systems evolved in that 
order. Id. at 15–17. 
53  See, e.g., ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN 
BRAIN 3–79 (1994) (discussing and analyzing the case of Phineas P. Gage and other similar 
cases of prefrontal lobe damage); LEDOUX, supra note 44, at 98–101 (1996). 
54  BALL & KEENAN, supra note 8, at 19. 
55  DAMASIO, supra note 53, at 84, 247–50. 
56  Ball and Keenan put this more colorfully: “Logic cannot budge a Reptile out of survival 
stance.” BALL & KEENAN, supra note 8, at 26. Their point is that once the reptilian brain de-
tects a danger that it believes is a threat to its survival, or the survival of its community, the 
reptilian brain springs into action and overrides both the limbic system and the neocortex 
(the logical brain). In fact it may even recruit the limbic system as a means of overcoming 
the logical brain. 
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Professor Damasio has long been at the forefront of studying the emotional 
brain and its impact on logical thinking. His groundbreaking work Descartes’ 
Error challenged the French philosopher’s maxim “I think, therefore I am.”57 
Based on both historical and modern clinical studies of patients with damage to 
the regions of the brain thought to control emotional responses, Damasio con-
cluded that the emotional brain is not subservient to the rational brain; instead it 
is actually essential to rational thinking.58 
In a later work, Damasio argues that “emotions are biologically determined 
processes, depending on innately set brain devices, laid down by a long evolu-
tionary history.”59 He writes further that “most, if not all, emotional responses 
are the result of a long history of evolutionary fine-tuning. Emotions are part of 
the bioregulatory devices with which we come equipped to survive.”60 Emo-
tions serve useful biological functions that enable an organism to react immedi-
ately, and usually reliably, to various stimuli, from perceived dangers to valua-
ble or pleasurable situations. “[E]motions are not a dispensable luxury. 
Emotions are curious adaptations that are part and parcel of the machinery with 
which organisms regulate survival.”61 
Damasio describes a patient of his (whom he refers to simply as “S”) who 
presented with mild seizures. He discovered that she suffered from an organic 
brain disease that had calcified the amygdalae on both sides of her brain. The 
remainder of her brain appeared normal on CT scans. After resolving the sei-
zure issue with medication, he began a study spanning several years to deter-
mine whether the severe damage to her amygdalae had resulted in any cogni-
tive or social impairment.62 
Damasio and his research team concluded that S’s ability to learn new facts 
was completely unimpaired. Likewise, her language skills, sensory perception, 
and general intelligence appeared to be perfectly normal. However, her social 
skills were abnormal. Damasio reported: 
S approached people and situations with a predominantly positive attitude. Oth-
ers would say that her approach was excessively and inappropriately forthcom-
ing. S was not only pleasant and cheerful, she seemed eager to interact with 
most anyone who would engage her in conversation . . . [and] the reserve and 
reticence one would have expected from her was simply lacking. . . . She made 
friends easily, formed romantic attachments without difficulty, and had often 
been taken advantage of by those she trusted.63 
                                                        
57  DAMASIO, supra note 53, at 247–50. 
58  Id. at 83–84. 
59  ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE 
MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 51 (1999). 
60  Id. at 53. 
61  Id. at 54. 
62  Id. at 62–64. 
63  Id. at 64. 
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Upon further study, Damasio and his team concluded that the damage to 
S’s amygdalae had impaired her ability to feel fear and anger, which allowed 
her life to be dominated by positive emotions.64 He concluded that: 
Immersed in a secure Pollyanna world . . . individuals [like S] cannot protect 
themselves against simple and not-so-simple social risks and are thus more vul-
nerable and less independent than we are. Their life histories testify to this 
chronic impairment as much as they testify to the paramount importance of emo-
tion in the governance not just of simple creatures but of humans as well.65 
To sum up, the negativity bias is an evolutionary adaptation that helps or-
ganisms avoid or respond to danger. The bias is deeply rooted in the brain’s 
limbic system, which involves the emotional brain. Because emotional thinking 
is closely related to, and necessary for, logical reasoning, it is unlikely and 
probably impossible for one’s rational brain to completely overrule the emo-
tional brain—of which the negativity bias is an important part. 
III. WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH PERSUASION? 
The negativity bias posits that the human brain is more attentive to nega-
tive information. It processes negative information more thoroughly, and there-
fore is more likely to be influenced by it and to remember it longer. That seems 
to have some significant implications for persuasive legal writing. For example, 
does this mean counteranalysis is more important than we might otherwise 
think? Does the negativity bias help us think about whether, and how, to pre-
sent policy arguments? What about a choice of theme? Should advocates 
choose a negative theme, attacking their opponents, rather than a positive 
theme showing the court why their client is deserving of relief? A related ques-
tion relates to tone: should written advocacy adopt an aggressive, attacking tone 
(i.e. “going negative”), or a more neutral, apparently objective tone? And, per-
haps most importantly, are judges really affected by this bias?66 Or can they 
avoid this bias simply by becoming aware of it? What follows is a preliminary 
exploration of these questions, starting with the last one. 
A. Are Judges Affected by the Negativity Bias? 
The simple answer to this question is probably, of course they are! To the 
extent that the negativity bias is a natural, deep-seated feature of the human 
brain, judges are not immune to its influence. But, of course, the simple an-
swers are usually incomplete, or even misleading. Let us dig a little deeper. 
                                                        
64  Id. at 65–66. Recall MacLean’s analogy that the limbic system (of which the amygdala is 
an important part) serves as an “amplifier” for threats and dangers perceived by the reptilian 
brain. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
65  DAMASIO, supra note 59, at 67. 
66  A fairly compelling case can be made that jurors are likely affected by the negativity bias. 
In fact, a prominent plaintiff’s trial lawyer has written a “manual” recommending ways in 
which plaintiffs’ lawyers can appeal to the “Reptile” in jurors’ brains in order to achieve 
success. See generally BALL & KEENAN, supra note 8. 
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1. System 1 and System 2 Thinking 
What should we make of the studies discussed above67 that suggest that the 
negativity bias may decline over time? Does that mean that lawyers need to 
write a different brief for older judges than for younger ones? Probably not, be-
cause the studies reported still show that although negative stimuli become less 
powerful over time, by age sixty negative information still has slightly more 
power than positive information.68 But, what those studies may suggest is that 
motivated cognition may overcome instinctive reactions.69 In other words, there 
is hope: although negative information may initially be more powerful, it can 
be overcome by higher-level reasoning focusing more on positive information. 
Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman has recently proposed a construct in 
which he describes two ways in which the human brain processes stimuli and 
makes decisions. He describes “System 1” thinking as intuitive, “fast” thinking; 
it processes stimuli almost instantaneously and unconsciously.70 “System 2” is 
more methodical; it monitors System 1, articulates judgments and makes choic-
es. It is “who we think we are;” essentially, it is our conscious, rational self.71 It 
does not operate independently of System 1 because “it often endorses or ra-
tionalizes ideas and feelings that were generated by System 1.”72 However, 
System 2 can be trained to overrule System 1, which is a good thing because 
System 1 often makes mistakes. Kahneman uses the famous example of the 
Müller-Lyon illusion:73 
Anybody who looks at this image “knows” that the horizontal line on the 
upper image is longer than the horizontal line on the lower one. At least, that is 
what your System 1 perception tells you, instinctively and automatically be-
cause the line looks longer to your brain. But, take out a ruler and measure the 
two lines and you will discover that they are exactly the same length. That is 
                
67 See supra text accompanying notes. 28–36. 
68 Kisley et al., supra note 32, at 841 fig.2. 
69 “[A]s people age, they devote more resources to controlling negative emotional respons-
es, but allow automatic responses to positive stimuli to proceed without restraint.” Id. at 842. 
70 KAHNEMAN, supra note 12, at 408, 415. 
71 Id.
72 Id. at 415. 
73 Id. at 27. 
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your System 2 processing and correcting misinformation provided by System 
1.74 
Shouldn’t it therefore be possible for a judge to train her System 2 process-
es to detect and overrule incorrect intuitions and feelings generated by System 
1? Kahneman is skeptical. First, he points out that even though System 2 now 
knows that the two horizontal lines are the same length, the upper line still 
looks longer.75 Second, he points out that “[n]ot all illusions are visual.”76 He 
describes “cognitive illusions” in which sympathy for an individual might 
cloud a judgment about that individual. Because that sympathy arises from Sys-
tem 1, it is harder to detect because it is unconscious and feels right.77 Kahne-
man argues that cognitive illusions are very difficult to overcome “[b]ecause 
System 1 operates automatically and cannot be turned off at will, errors of intu-
itive thought are often difficult to prevent. Biases cannot always be avoided, 
because System 2 may have no clue to the error.”78 But he does offer this 
glimmer of hope: “[t]he best we can do is . . . [to] learn to recognize situations 
in which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes when 
the stakes are high.”79 
To the extent that “stakes are high” in every decision a judge has to make, 
perhaps it is possible for a judge to learn to spot biases and overcome them. 
However, psychological research into judicial biases to date has suggested that 
most judges are still subject to the same types of cognitive biases that the rest 
of us are.80 More empirical research into this phenomenon would be useful. 
2. Stake in the Outcome 
Most of the studies reported above that have investigated the negativity bi-
as do so from the perspective of determining how individuals make choices rel-
                                                        
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 27 (“You have chosen to believe the measurement, but you cannot prevent System 1 
from doing its thing; you cannot decide to see the lines as equal, although you know they 
are.”). 
76  Id. 
77  Id. at 27–28. 
78  Id. at 28. 
79  Id. 
80  See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2007) (studying the effect of intuition on judicial decisionmaking); 
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) (studying 
the effect of five common cognitive illusions on the decisionmaking of 167 federal magis-
trate judges); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judg-
es?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195 (2009); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ig-
nore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U.  
PA. L. REV. 1251, 1251–52 (2005) (studying whether judges really can ignore  
inadmissible evidence); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, and  
Hindsight 1, 10, 13–17, 19–27 (July 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1877125. 
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evant to their own well-being.81 The question most frequently asked is whether 
the negative information motivates them to make a choice pertinent to their 
own lives. Having a personal stake in the choice to be made may have a signifi-
cant impact on how seriously they evaluate the negative information. To some 
extent, the subjects of these investigations are personally “at risk” in these ex-
periments. 
But, judges are not personally at risk in most of the cases they decide. 
Thus, one must ask: to what extent are the teachings of these experiments trans-
ferable to the judicial decision-making environment? Because judges, for the 
most part, do not have to live with the consequences of the decisions they ren-
der, can they detach themselves from the negative information and thus over-
come the negativity bias? 
A definitive answer to these questions cannot be made without some exper-
imentation (and probably not even then because the answers would be murky). 
But let me propose a hypothesis for such an investigation: in most cases, a 
judge’s thinking would still be significantly influenced by the negativity bias. 
Here is why I think this is likely to be true. 
First, one of the features of the reptilian brain is that it protects not only it-
self, but its community. Remember that the only concern of the reptilian brain 
is the survival of the organism; or, more accurately, the organism’s genes, so 
that the species can continue after the death of the organism.82 Communities 
can make organisms safer.83 Therefore, a threat to the community can awaken 
the reptile in each of us, thereby providing powerful incentive to act in such a 
way as to protect the community. To the extent that judges see themselves as 
protectors of civil community,84 negative information or events that might 
threaten that community are likely to awaken the judges’ inner reptiles, and 
motivate them to take action to protect the community.85 
                                                        
81  To that extent, therefore, these are studies of our reptilian brain, since that is the region of 
the brain most concerned with survival. See supra text accompanying notes 54–56. 
82  BALL & KEENAN, supra note 8, at 21. 
83  Id. at 27. 
84  Prof. Ruth Anne Robbins has argued that litigants should cast judges in the role of men-
tors to the litigants. Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the 
Client’s Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 782 (2006). In a pure story about the parties, that is their most like-
ly role. However, in a story about the law, the judge might play the role of the ruler hero be-
cause the judge must create a new rule of law or interpret an ambiguous rule in such a way 
as to create a prosperous community. Id. at 803. 
85  I am not claiming that this response is the only, or even the most important, influence on a 
judge’s behavior. Reptilian responses are instinctive and instantaneous; judges generally 
have time to think and reflect, which likely mitigates the effect of the reptilian response. See 
supra Part III.A.1, for a discussion of System 1 and System 2 responses. I am claiming, 
however, that any instinctive protective response that a judge may feel is likely to feel nor-
mal and natural to the judge, and could well provide at least some motivation for a particular 
ruling. 
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Second, several of the leaders of the Applied Legal Storytelling movement 
have proposed that any lawsuit involves potentially as many as three different 
stories (plot lines, if you will). The lawsuit could be a story about the parties to 
the lawsuit (i.e. the dispute that caused the lawsuit to be filed in the first place). 
It could be a story about the law itself (such as the recent series of cases involv-
ing the right to same-sex marriage, where the individual facts are not that dif-
ferent but the purpose of the lawsuit is to change the law). Or, the lawsuit may 
involve a story of the process (i.e. the procedures by which a court goes about 
its work).86 Any lawsuit could involve several, or all three, of these types of 
stories. For example, a plaintiff might claim a statute is unconstitutional on its 
face (a story about the law), while alternatively claiming that it is unconstitu-
tional as applied (a story about the parties). The defendant may then file a mo-
tion to dismiss that case on the basis that the plaintiffs lack standing to sue (a 
story of the process). Many lawsuits will tell several of these stories at different 
points in time; for example, by testing the structure of the case (stories of the 
process) through early motions, then testing the merits of the case through dis-
positive motions (stories of either the law or the parties). 
In the case of stories about the process, it is hard to claim that the judge de-
ciding the case does not have a personal stake in the outcome; after all, the sto-
ry turns on whether the judge has the power to decide the case, or the methods 
the judge will use to decide the case. And in a story about the law, once again it 
seems like the judge has an indirect, yet still personal, stake in the outcome. To 
the extent a story of the law is designed to change the law that governs society, 
the judge, as a member of that society, is affected by the outcome as much as 
any other member of society.87 
I suggest, however, that even in a story about the parties, the judge, espe-
cially at the trial level, has a stake in the outcome sufficient to trigger the nega-
tivity bias. The trial judge in particular is likely aware that whatever decision 
she renders is unlikely to be appealed, and even if appealed it is unlikely to be 
reversed.88 With the understanding that the trial judge’s decision is likely final 
comes the responsibility to reach the correct result. Thus, a conscientious trial 
judge will have to carefully consider the consequences of her decision on the 
litigants before her,89 and in doing so, become a participant (albeit transiently) 
                                                        
86  RUTH ANNE ROBBINS ET AL., YOUR CLIENT’S STORY: PERSUASIVE LEGAL WRITING 104 
(2013). 
87  This may be more true of appellate judges than of trial judges. 
88  Consolidated reversal data for state courts is difficult to obtain. For federal courts, in the 
fiscal year ending on June 30, 2013, of 58,534 appeals terminated in all circuits, only 6.9 
percent of all types of appeals resulted in a reversal. Cases categorized as “other private civ-
il” cases were reversed at a rate of 11.3 percent. U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—
APPEALS TERMINATED ON THE MERITS, BY CIRCUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD  
ENDING JUNE 30, 2013 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics 
/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2013/june/B05Jun13.pdf. 
89  Or, stated another way, the judge must have empathy for the litigants. See Thomas B. 
Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1944, 1946 (2012). 
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in the lives of those litigants. At that moment, it seems, the negativity bias will 
most likely come into play. 
This may be a controversial claim. Legal positivists will likely claim that a 
trial judge should decide a case based solely on the law, and should not allow 
her emotions to cloud her judgment. However, this claim overlooks the fact that 
many of the rules of law that the court is asked to apply contain fuzzy standards 
that can only be resolved through narrative reasoning (i.e. reasoning that en-
gages the judge’s emotional intelligence).90 
Even appellate judges are probably not immune from relying on their per-
sonal belief systems in rendering their decisions. Chief Justice John Roberts, 
during his Senate confirmation hearings, famously claimed that he was merely 
an umpire calling balls and strikes, relying only on the rule of law.91 But, 
according to one observer, “[i]n every major case since he became the nation’s 
seventeenth Chief Justice, Roberts has sided with the prosecution over the de-
fendant, the state over the condemned, the executive branch over the legislative, 
and the corporate defendant over the individual plaintiff.” The Chief Justice 
thinks that he is umpiring in a neutral fashion, but perhaps he is just subcon-
sciously empathizing only with those whose experiences and perspectives most 
closely resemble his own as a former corporate and executive-branch lawyer.92 
To the extent that appellate judges are guided by their own “experiences 
and perceptions,” the negativity bias is likely to influence their perception of 
the parties and therefore their thinking about how a case should be decided. 
B. Addressing Adverse Information (Counteranalysis) 
So if judges are likely to be affected by a negativity bias, what are some of 
the ways in which this might happen? The major premise of this article is that 
negative information is more powerful than positive information. Lawsuits, of 
course, are full of negative information: both, or all, sides involved in the dis-
pute draw different conclusions from the same set of facts and circumstances, 
and try to paint their opponents in as poor a light as possible. If it is true that 
negative information is more powerful than positive information, then it seems 
likely that at some point in almost any litigated matter, an advocate is going to 
need to address adverse (negative) information. 
                                                        
90  Kenneth D. Chestek, The Life of the Law Has Not Been Logic: It Has Been Story, 1 
SAVANNAH L. REV. 21, 29–33 (2014); see also Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Vic-
tim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366 (1996); Terry A. Maroney, The Persis-
tent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 629, 645–48 (2011) (arguing 
that good reasoning requires engaging the emotional brain). 
91  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
92  Colby, supra note 89, at 1993 (footnote omitted) (citing Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. 
Nice Guy, NEW YORKER (May 25, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009 
/05/25/090525fa_fact_toobin). 
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Lawyers have long debated about whether, or how, to disclose adverse in-
formation (bad facts or bad law) when representing a client.93 Professor 
Kathryn Stanchi has studied the issue by looking at social science research, and 
concluded “in many situations, there is a strategic advantage to preemptively 
raising negative information.”94 There are two bodies of social science research 
that lead her to this conclusion: research into “message sidedness,” which es-
sentially considers whether one- or two-sided messages are more persuasive, 
and “inoculation theory.”95 Stanchi looked at numerous psychological studies 
and concluded that “[t]wo-sided refutational messages are more effective be-
cause they cause sustained attitude change that is less vulnerable to opposing 
arguments.”96 She also concluded that this effect is a result of the enhanced 
credibility of the advocate in presenting both sides of the issue. Since “[m]ost 
people expect issues to have two sides, . . . two-sided messages lead the audi-
ence to perceive the message source as more credible and knowledgeable than 
one-sided messages.”97 
Perhaps more importantly for our current inquiry, inoculation theory also 
suggests that in many cases presenting negative information before your oppo-
nent has the opportunity to do so is a better choice than waiting for your oppo-
nent to raise the bad information and then trying to refute it post-hoc. Inocula-
tion, as the name implies, works by presenting the audience with a weakened 
version of the adverse argument or bad facts in an effort to make the audience 
resistant to that information when presented at full strength by opposing coun-
sel.98 The research reviewed by Stanchi concluded that, in many situations, in-
oculating messages did in fact cause the message recipients to resist the later 
bad information.99 
This, of course, does not prove that “bad is stronger than good.” It does 
suggest, however, that “bad is strong and must be dealt with,” or perhaps more 
optimistically, “bad is strong and can be dealt with.” Professor Stanchi’s analy-
sis of why inoculation works may shed some insight on the power of bad. She 
writes that “[t]he key to the inoculation response is ‘threat.’ ”100 In essence, bad 
is recruited to serve the good because upon seeing the weakened version of the 
bad information, the recipient generates stronger counterarguments that favor 
the position advocated. When the stronger version of the harmful argument is 
                                                        
93  For a good discussion of both sides of this debate, see Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with 
Fire: The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 
381, 383–92 (2008) [hereinafter Stanchi, Playing with Fire]; see also Kathryn Stanchi, What 
Cognitive Dissonance Tells Us About Tone in Persuasion, 22 BROOKLYN J.L. & POL’Y 101, 
102 (2013) [hereinafter Stanchi, Cognitive Dissonance]. 
94  Stanchi, Playing with Fire, supra note 93, at 393. 
95  Id. at 392–93. 
96  Id. at 395. 
97  Id. at 397. 
98  Id. at 399–400. 
99  Id. at 401–06. 
100  Id. at 406. 
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then perceived, the favorable counterargument is retrieved to refute the harmful 
argument. And, because the recipient of the inoculation generates the counter-
argument, that argument is inherently persuasive to the recipient. 
So: bad is strong, but can be turned to good through careful counteranaly-
sis. 
C. Making Policy Arguments 
Another possible implication of the negativity bias may reside in how an 
advocate phrases an argument to the court. Will the court be more amenable to 
a negative argument as opposed to a positive one? 
Professor Michael R. Smith has proposed that, because of a combination of 
several cognitive phenomena, including the loss aversion effect, the endow-
ment effect, and the negativity bias, a policy argument may be more effective if 
phrased in terms of avoiding bad outcomes rather than promoting good ones.101 
He argues, for example, that the classic slippery slope argument can be phrased 
more memorably and persuasively as avoiding a negative outcome: X result 
would prevent a “flood of litigation” is stronger than X result would protect the 
“resources and efficiency of the court.”102 He provides numerous examples of 
how this is fairly easy to do, as most positive statements can be stated in the in-
verse. 
Policy arguments are sometimes used to advocate for a new rule or a 
change in the law.103 Professor Smith cites Ahtna Tene Nené v. Alaska Dep’t of 
Fish & Game104 as an example of how a narrative argument based on the policy 
of fairness succeeded in creating a new rule regarding the practice of law by 
unlicensed individuals.105 Notably, the court ruled that allowing unlicensed in-
dividuals to recover attorney fees “without taking on the obligations and re-
sponsibilities of being a lawyer is fundamentally unfair.”106 The fact that the 
court phrased its rational negatively, that is, in terms of unfairness instead of 
fairness, suggests that the negativity bias played a role in its decision.107 
D. Choosing Themes 
Counteranalysis and policy arguments are just two specific places where 
the negativity bias might play a role in shaping a judge’s thoughts about a par-
                                                        
101  Michael R. Smith, The Sociological and Cognitive Dimensions of Policy-Based Persua-
sion, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 35, 76–79 (2013). 
102  See id. at 78. 
103  Id. at 51–53. 
104  Ahtna Tene Nené v. Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, 288 P.3d 452 (Alaska 2012). 
105  Smith, supra note 101, at 51–53. 
106  Ahtna, 288 P.3d at 463 (emphasis added). 
107  For additional discussion of the role of the negativity bias in arguing for a change in the 
law, see discussion infra Part III.D.3. 
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ticular case. But what about a more general concept: the theme of an advocate’s 
case? 
One definition of a theme of a case is “the essential reason [a] writer ad-
vances to convince a judge or jury that a ruling in [your client’s favor] is fair, 
just, and emotionally satisfying.”108 Note that the “theme” differs from the 
“theory” of a case. The “theory” refers to the legal theory that gives the court a 
legal basis to rule in your client’s favor, or the logos strand of reasoning.109 The 
theme relates more to pathos of the argument, and therefore may be influenced 
by the negativity bias. 
Themes can be positive: “The court should rule in my client’s favor be-
cause my client is good and therefore worthy of assistance.” Or they can be 
negative: “The court should rule in my client’s favor because the opposing par-
ty is bad and therefore not worthy of assistance.” Or perhaps they are some-
where in between: “My client has been grievously harmed and needs help from 
this court.” The question therefore becomes, if negative information is more 
powerful than positive, shouldn’t advocates always choose negative themes? 
As abstract as that question is, I know the answer as definitively as the su-
percomputer Deep Thought knows the answer to the Great Question of Life, 
the Universe, and Everything.110 The correct choice of theme is: it depends.111 
But, just as Deep Thought’s answer simply led to another question, my answer 
does too: what does your choice of theme depend on? 
Unfortunately, this deeper question cannot be answered satisfactorily with-
out empirical research. I would like to offer a few test hypotheses for such an 
experiment based upon what cognitive psychologists have studied.112 Let me 
propose a few common types of factual disputes and legal issues, and suggest 
what thematic choices might be suggested by the research. 
1. The Legal Issue Revolves Around Dishonest or Immoral Conduct 
Suppose your case, or at least one aspect of your case, depends on a finding 
that the opponent behaved in a dishonest or immoral manner. This could arise, 
for example, in a case where a plaintiff seeks exemplary damages, or where a 
defendant raises a defense of unclean hands or laches in an equity case. In such 
a situation, a negative theme is likely to be most persuasive, since the negativi-
                                                        
108  ROBBINS ET AL, supra note 86, at 45. Ball and Keenan define “theme” as “the establish-
ing and maintaining of a concept as one of the lenses through which jurors continually view 
the trial.” BALL AND KEENAN, supra note 8, at 102. 
109  Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story, 
7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 14 (2010). 
110  The answer, of course, is forty-two. See DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHIKER’S GUIDE TO 
THE GALAXY (1979). 
111  This is the SLA, or Standard Legal Answer. It is the correct answer to every legal ques-
tion. 
112  See supra Part I. 
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ty bias seems to hold greater potency when moral behavior is being evaluat-
ed.113 
2. The Legal Issue Revolves Around Competence 
Alternatively, the case may depend on a determination that your client is 
competent and likely to perform competently in the future. For example, in a 
child custody dispute, the court may be required to decide which of two liti-
gants is likely to provide a safer and more stable home environment for minor 
children. In such a case, a positive theme is best (i.e. showing the positive traits 
of your client rather than focusing on the negative traits of the opposing client). 
This is because there appears to be a positivity bias when persons must evaluate 
the competency of another.114 
A question arises, however, about whether the positivity bias applies only 
prospectively, or if it influences a judge’s, or jury’s, decision about whether 
somebody acted competently in the past. For example, in a medical malpractice 
case, will evidence that the defendant doctor has successfully performed the 
same procedure countless previous times trigger the jury’s positivity bias and 
make it more likely that the jury will find the doctor performed competently 
this time? Or, will it simply create contrast in the jury’s mind between the doc-
tor’s usual successful practice and this one incident where the procedure was 
unsuccessful? That is to say, a jury may conclude that if the doctor had been 
able to do this procedure without incident frequently in the past, he must have 
done something very wrong this time to get the different result. If that is the 
case, the positive theme chosen by the defendant (the doctor is competent) may 
only enhance the power of the negative theme chosen by the plaintiff (this doc-
tor made a horrible mistake). More research on this question would be interest-
ing, but probably not conclusive, since the facts of real cases vary widely. 
3. The Law (or the Rules of Procedure) Need to Be Changed in Order for 
Your Client to Prevail 
This is the classic “story of the law” situation.115 Sometimes, the point of 
the lawsuit is to force a substantive change to the common law, or the interpre-
tation of enacted law. In such cases, the individual facts of the case are often 
undisputed and nearly irrelevant. The “opposing party” is often the govern-
ment, or some proxy for the government that has a vested interested in keeping 
the law unchanged. The most significant current example of this type of lawsuit 
                                                        
113  See supra text accompanying notes 26–27. 
114  See supra text accompanying notes 26–27. Of course, another factor may be at play in 
this example: the parent that “goes negative” may be viewed by the court as more selfish and 
less interested in the welfare of the child than the parent which takes the higher road. 
115  Note that a claim that the rules of procedure should be changed is really a story of the 
law, not a story of the process. In a true story of the process, the rules of procedure are not at 
issue; it is how those rules apply to the case in front of the judge that is controverted. 
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is the widespread litigation about the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in 
the wake of United States v. Windsor,116 although there are have been many 
similar types of cases over the years. 
It seems likely that in this type of case, both sides should choose negative 
themes. Because the cognitive psychology research suggests that the recipient 
processes negative information more thoroughly, plaintiff’s counsel should cer-
tainly attempt to demonstrate how the existing state of the law causes injury to 
her client or members of the class of persons of which her client is a member. 
Forcing the judge to process that negative information seems more likely to re-
sult in a ruling changing the status quo than a theme which merely shows how 
much better the plaintiff’s life would be if the rules were different. 
But, even the defendant in such a case should arguably choose a negative 
theme as well. That is, defendants should portray the requested change as a 
threat to the settled, tranquil state of affairs currently in force. Stability is gen-
erally perceived to be safe, and changes are threatening; therefore, any change 
to the law may awaken the defensive instincts of the reptile within. 
However, the themes of the same-sex marriage cases that are coursing rap-
idly through the courts today may seem to contradict my analysis that advo-
cates for changing the legal rules should choose a negative theme. The theme 
chosen by many same-sex marriage advocates has been “fairness.”117 Some 
courts have explicitly cited fairness as at least part of the rationale for striking 
down bans on same-sex marriage.118 But, isn’t “fairness” a value we all share, 
and therefore a positive theme? 
                                                        
116  United States v. Windsor,  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
117  See, e.g., FAIRNESS COALITION, http://fairnesscoalition.org/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) 
(touting the fact that since Kentucky passed a human rights act in 1960, “cities like Lexing-
ton, Louisville, and Covington have all worked tirelessly to honor this legacy by enacting 
fairness ordinances—laws that ensure everyone in our commonwealth has equal protection,” 
specifically nondiscrimination against LGBT persons); Marriage Fairness, N.Y. CIV. 
LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/issues/lgbt-rights/marriage-fairness (last visited Apr. 
27, 2015); Out for Freedom, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/out-freedom 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (making the argument that “we can decisively win fair marriage 
laws and relegate discrimination against gay and lesbian couples to the dustbin of history”); 
see also Federal Appeals Court Says Gay Couples Have Right to Marry, CBS NEWS (June 
24, 2014, 10:15 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/federal-appeals-court-says-gay-cou 
ples-have-right-to-marry/ (stating the lead counsel for the plaintiffs in the recent Tenth Cir-
cuit decision striking down Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage, Peggy Tomsic, hailed the de-
cision as “an absolute victory for fairness and equality for all families in Utah, in every state 
in the 10th Circuit and every state in this great nation of the United States”). 
118  See, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014). Judge Arenda L. 
Wright Allen eloquently quoted Abraham Lincoln: 
Almost one hundred and fifty four years ago, as Abraham Lincoln approached 
the cataclysmic rending of our nation over a struggle for other freedoms, a rending 
that would take his life and the lives of hundreds of thousands of others, he wrote 
these words: “It can not have failed to strike you that these men ask for just . . . the 
same thing—fairness, and fairness only. This, so far as in my power, they, and all 
others, shall have.” 
628 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:605 
On closer examination, the “fairness” theme implicitly triggers the negativ-
ity bias. Everybody is in favor of fairness; so why are these same-sex couples 
in court? Oh, they are claiming that they have been denied fairness for arbitrary 
reasons. That is bad! The plaintiffs in these cases produce evidence of negative 
consequences of this arbitrary rule,119 which requires the listener to think and 
process that information—one of the main reasons why negative stimuli are so 
powerful. Thus the reptile awakens to protect the value of “fairness” and a sta-
ble community. 
The example of the same-sex marriage cases leads to a categorization prob-
lem: what is the difference between a positive theme and a negative theme? 
Can’t all negative themes be phrased in a positive way, just as many plaintiffs 
have done in that litigation? 
Jury consultant David Ball and prominent plaintiff’s attorney Don Keenan 
argue that, although they recommend trying to awaken the reptile in each juror, 
“[g]loom and doom don’t win cases for you.” They recommend selecting a 
theme that inspires the reptile to provide a positive solution, even though the 
reptile was awakened by a fear response or negative stimuli. From a plaintiff’s 
perspective, they suggest choosing themes that make a jury feel safer. That is, 
they recommend not focusing on how badly the plaintiff was injured and on 
how he needs a big verdict (a negative theme), but instead focusing on what 
safety rule the defendant violated, and how awarding a verdict will deter that 
defendant and others from violating that safety rule in the future.120 Thus, in a 
medical malpractice case, the plaintiff should focus the jury’s attention not on 
the doctor’s bad behavior (i.e. the doctor hurt the patient grievously by failing 
                                                                                                                                
The men and women, and the children too, whose voices join in noble harmony 
with Plaintiffs today, also ask for fairness, and fairness only. This, so far as it is in this 
Court’s power, they and all others shall have. 
Id. 
119  See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 3–4, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th 
Cir. 2014) (No. 13-4178), 2014 WL 897509, at *3–4, (leading to the decision affirming the 
striking down of Utah’s same-sex marriage statute in Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 
(10th Cir. 2014)). The brief’s introduction stated: 
Amendment 3 denies same-sex couples the vast array of state and federal protections 
that enable married couples to join their lives together, care for one another in times 
of illness and crisis, be recognized as a surviving spouse in the event of the other 
partner’s death, provide for one another financially, make important joint decisions, 
and have their relationship acknowledged and respected by the government and third 
parties. No matter how deeply they care for one another or how long they have stood 
by one another, for better or for worse, in sickness and in health, Amendment 3 treats 
Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples as legal strangers to one another. It communi-
cates to them and to all the world that their relationships are not as real, valuable, or 
worthy as those of opposite-sex couples; that they are worthy of no recognition at all; 
and that they are not, and never can be, true families. 
Id. 
120  Whether you consider that a negative theme (defendant violated a rule) or a positive one 
(the jury can encourage safe future behavior) is debatable but almost meaningless. The 
theme incorporates both negative and positive elements. 
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to live up to the standard of care), but on the safety rule that needs to be en-
forced (i.e. doctors should not needlessly risk injury to their patients by per-
forming surgeries in a particular way; the best way to prevent future injuries is 
to award damages to this patient equivalent to his grievous injury).121 
In the context of the same-sex marriage litigation, that is exactly how the 
appeal to “fairness” works. “Unfairness” is a threat, in the sense that fairness is 
a “safety rule” imposed for the good of society (i.e. it is a value that we all 
agree about). Therefore, rules that are unfair are a threat to the community, and 
the safest thing to do is to replace those rules with more fair rules. 
4. Often, Multiple Themes May Be Useful 
Most lawsuits, of course, are primarily stories about the parties. Some con-
flict arose between one or more persons or entities, and the court’s job is simp-
ly to sort out the dispute and resolve it. It is nearly impossible to generalize 
about thematic choices in such cases, because the universe of possibilities is 
probably endless. But, it might still be useful to think about the advocate’s 
choices in these cases. 
First, remember that each party in these cases will be telling different sto-
ries about each other. The judge’s or jury’s default position is likely to be that 
all parties to the case acted with good intentions, and that no party is purely evil 
or purely good.122 Therefore, any attempt to go completely negative will likely 
be met with skepticism, as will any attempt to portray your client as flawless. 
Your theme or themes should therefore be chosen to present the world as it 
likely is: not perfect, but on balance favoring your client. 
There is no reason why an advocate needs to limit herself to a single 
theme. If you go with multiple themes, consider choosing a positive and a 
negative one: my client is good AND the opponents are bad. The tension be-
tween those two themes creates the conflict that drives the story. 
E. Choosing Tone 
A concept related to theme is tone. Although the tone of written advocacy 
relates more to ethos, it seems likely that the negativity bias is still at play here. 
Would a brief that adopts a strident, aggressive tone (think of the negative po-
litical ads referred to at the beginning of the article) be more effective than a 
more neutral, objective-sounding tone? After all, the negativity bias works by 
commanding more of the listener’s attention, and by causing the brain to pro-
cess negative information more thoroughly. Shouldn’t that be a useful outcome 
for the advocate? 
                                                        
121  BALL AND KEENAN, supra note 8, at 62–66. 
122  ROBBINS ET AL., supra note 86, at 92; see also Cathren Koehlert-Page, Breaking Bad 
Facts: What Intriguing Contradictions in Fiction Narratives Can Teach Lawyers About Cop-
ing with Harmful Evidence (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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Professor Kathryn Stanchi suggests that a negative tone in a legal brief 
might backfire, because it could cause the recipient to reject the message.123 
She analyzes the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, both in situations where 
it is harmful to the advocate (by creating a barrier to persuasion) and helpful 
(by creating an opportunity to minimize harmful facts or legal concepts). The 
former situation is most relevant to the concept of tone. 
Legal writing professors, judges, and skilled advocates almost universally 
advise brief writers to avoid ad hominem attacks on opposing counsel or the 
lower court in an appellate brief. That advice seems to run counter to the notion 
that “bad is stronger than good,” but Stanchi argues a brief that is too strident in 
tone can cause a reader to feel manipulated, which “arouse[s] all kinds of nega-
tive feelings, including anger and betrayal.”124 This typically causes a “reac-
tance” response in the reader that may motivate the reader to reject the message 
or even to generate a positive response to the message being attacked.125 
Stanchi cites an interesting “think aloud” study conducted by Professor Jim 
Stratman, in which he asked an advocate to record his thoughts as he wrote an 
appellate brief.126 He then showed the brief to a group of law clerks and had 
them record their responses to the brief as they read it. The attorney’s thoughts 
centered on different ways he could “attack” the lower court’s opinion; the re-
sulting brief had a “harshly negative” tone regarding the lower court opinion, 
which attacked even the most trivial aspects of the opinion.127 The result was 
predictable: the law clerks reacted negatively to the advocate and ultimately re-
jected the message of the brief.128 
While the results of Stratman’s study are not surprising, his “think aloud” 
technique is intriguing. It would be useful for other scholars to do similar ex-
periments and analyze the results on actual cases with live subjects. 
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Social science is not exact. Because it deals with human behavior and the 
wide range of possibilities among each individual, all social scientists can do is 
look for patterns and make generalizations. One researcher proposes a hypothe-
sis, tests it through experimentation, and then reports her findings to her peers. 
Others read the report and either replicate (or not) the findings through further 
testing, or they vary the parameters of the previous test, run a new experiment, 
and report those results to try to determine the boundaries or variables associat-
ed with the first finding. The investigators then discuss their findings with each 
                                                        
123  Stanchi, Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 93, at 107–08. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at 107–08, 115–16. 
126  James F. Stratman, Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal Discourse in Real Time: 
Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical Strategy in Appeal Court Briefs, 17 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 
1, 44, 46–47 (1994) (cited in Stanchi, Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 93 at 108 n.47). 
127  Stanchi, Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 91, at 109. 
128  Id. at 110. 
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other, theorize about what those findings mean, and consequently, knowledge 
of the studied phenomenon grows. 
Judicial decisionmaking is a form of human behavior that can, and should, 
be tested using social science methodology.129 Some work in this area has al-
ready begun,130 including some tests reported at the UNLV Conference on Psy-
chology and Lawyering.131 I hope to test some of the hypotheses I proposed 
above in future empirical studies, but I also encourage others to conduct similar 
research. We, as the legal academy, need to learn from our colleagues in the 
social science departments how to construct and implement scientifically valid 
studies, then compare our results to determine whether we are coming up with 
sound conclusions. I look forward to future Psychology of Lawyering confer-
ences where the conversation started in Las Vegas can continue. 
                                                        
129  Using empirical methods to examine judicial behavior is not without controversy. See, 
e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Essay, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1998) (“[E]ven when one looks carefully at the so-called ‘empirical 
studies’ that purport to analyze the work of my Circuit, it is clear that, in most cases, judicial 
decision making is a principled enterprise that is greatly facilitated by collegiality among 
judges.”); see generally Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical 
Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 
DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009). For a good overview of the current debate about using empirical 
methods to study judges, see generally Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideol-
ogy: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NORTHWESTERN U. L. 
REV. 743 (2005). 
130  See sources cited supra note 80; see also Chestek, supra note 109 (studying judges’ reac-
tions to narrative reasoning in an appellate brief). 
Other sorts of empirical studies which try to draw conclusions simply from examining 
judicial decisions without engaging the judges directly have been conducted by scholars for 
years; the recent book by Profs. Epstein, Landes, and Posner is but one example of such 
work. See generally EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11. There is of course great value in such 
studies, because they eliminate the possibility of skewed data resulting from cognitive biases 
or lack of judicial self-awareness. However, such studies require a good deal of interpreta-
tion and even some degree of speculation as to what is really going on. Direct psychological 
testing of the type described here is also a valuable tool for understanding judicial behavior. 
131  See, e.g., Nicole E. Negowetti, Implicit Bias and The Legal Profession’s “Diversity Cri-
sis”: A Call for Self-Reflection, 15 NEV. L.J. 930 (2015). 
